Critique of Pure Reason (I. Kant)
In the preface to the second edition of "Critique of Pure Reason" (page B xvi) Kant says: "Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects. On that presupposition, however, all our attempts to establish something about them a priori, by means of concepts through which our cognition would be expanded, have come to nothing. Let us, therefore, try to find out by experiment whether we shall not make better progress in the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition." How are we to understand this?
Is metaphysics a science?
To answer this question, a deeper understanding of what defines science is needed. In the preface to the second edition of his "Critique of Pure Reason", Kant delves into the fields of logics, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics to show us what makes mathematics and physics worthy of being called a science, as opposed to logics, science's "outer courtyard" where reason has only to do with itself, devoid of any object at all; or metaphysics, where reason is presented with objects, but with no intuition or experience as mathematics or physics would be. Indeed, based on the presupposition that the understanding subject acquires knowledge only by passively submitting itself to experience, with no added value whatsoever from its own reason, metaphysics seems like an pointless and endless "battlefield": in its very definition, metaphysics relies on the belief that there is knowledge without experience. Here comes the big question: can there actually be knowledge without experience?
Indeed, Kant is establishing the ground for a new theory of knowledge: in this preface, he distinguishes between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge. The former is exactly what metaphysics is based on: pure knowledge, preceding any experience, that lives in the understanding subject's reason. To try to solve the issue with metaphysics, Kant suggests we shift our viewpoint in regards to both forms of knowledge : before, we believed a posteriori knowledge came wholly from the world surrounding us, without even considering, or needing, an a priori knowledge. Now, similarly to what happened with the isosceles triangle, or Copernicus' revolution… What happens if we open our eyes to the possibility of an a priori knowledge that influences greatly the a posteriori knowledge, in that it shapes the considered object itself ?
Theaetetus (Plato)
At the end of the discussion of the definition "Knowledge is perception", Socrates argues that we do not see and hear "with" the eyes and the ears, but "through" the eyes and the ears. How are we to understand this? And in what way is it correct to say that Socrates argument is directed towards what we in modern terms call "empiricism"?In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates and Theaetetus discuss the meaning of knowledge : through three definitions offered by Theaetetus, we come closer to where Socrates wants to lead us.
The "Knowledge is perception" definition misses the idea of human cognition, implying there's nothing more to knowledge than what our organs sense: Thankfully Socrates reminds Theaetetus that organs are but a means for the sensory world and our cognition to meet. Based on our senses, our reason can build knowledge. In that sense, Socrates calls out to the notion of empiricism, where knowledge is built on experience.
What about Kant's a priori knowledge then? Perhaps this could counter Socrate's looming conclusion that truth can't be found in a world where knowledge is built through experimenting the objects of the world, objects that are changing indefinitely…
0 comments:
Post a Comment